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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the diplomatic relations of North Korea, officially known as the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), with an emphasis on its minor 
diplomatic relations. Minor, for purposes of this thesis, refers to those states other than 
the Big Four Plus One (i.e., China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the United States). 
This thesis covers the evolution of these relations, assesses trends, and predicts the 
direction in which these relations may be headed. 
While many refer to North Korea as a hermit kingdom, its diplomatic relations 
challenge this label. The DPRK has been and remains active diplomatically. The DRPK 
enjoys close relations with many states that continue to be marked by the rhetoric of a 
previous era. There is more continuity than change in its minor foreign relations; 
however, signs of new life cannot be ignored. While most of its bilateral-minor relations 
were established to help bolster its claim as the sole legitimate government of the Korean 
Peninsula, these relationships have become more important as the DPRK has become 
increasingly isolated. Furthermore, by keeping these relations warm, they assist 
Pyongyang in its possible efforts to engage in diplomatic hedging if needed. Over the 
years, as Pyongyang’s relationship with its primary benefactors has waxed and waned, it 
has engaged in expanded diplomatic efforts. In mid-2013, as China supported efforts for 
a more universal application of further restrictive sanctions on the DPRK, the beginning 
of a cooling period in DPRK-PRC relations can be seen. Given this potential waning of 
relations with its sole primary benefactor, the DPRK can be expected to enter into a new 
period of more energetic diplomacy. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
At some point, every child is warned to remain mindful of the company kept. The 
idea behind this age-old admonishment is that people, in the absence of other 
information, often judge others by those with whom they are associated. Of course, 
individuals have a range of company they keep. If this range is viewed in a linear manner, 
it likely spans from bitter enemy to close friend. Where a given relationship falls on this 
linear scale may indicate a number of things to outsiders. Contained within this 
admonishment, like most venerable nuggets of wisdom, some element of truth likely 
exists. If this old adage is accepted, then perhaps it has utility in providing additional 
information about a state. This type of inquiry may have particular value and is the type 
of analysis that must be employed when examining an opaque state like the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). With a state as closed and as secretive as the DPRK 
every bit of information that can be gathered is useful to the international community’s 
understanding of this outlier state. 
Using this idea as a launching point, this thesis explores the diplomatic relations 
of the DPRK with an emphasis on the minor diplomatic relations of the state. Minor, for 
purposes of this thesis, does not speak to durability of the bond between two states. 
Instead, it simply means those countries with which the DPRK has relations that are not 
part of what is referred to as the Big Four Plus One (i.e., China, Japan, South Korea, 
Russia, and the United States). This thesis’s core research questions are the following.  
 What common characteristics may be identified in diplomatic relations of 
the DPRK, with a particular emphasis on its minor relations, and what 
insights can they offer into the internal and external workings of the state? 
 Based on these insights what can be surmised regarding the strategic 
direction of the DPRK? 
 Does current DPRK diplomatic outreach predict a more belligerent, 
defiant North Korea? Or, perhaps, a state becoming a more enmeshed-
responsible player in the international system?  
 Are emerging or new allies and partners appearing while other stalwarts of 
the DPRK state begin to wane?  
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B. IMPORTANCE  
An inquiry into the DPRK’s foreign relations in the aggregate is an important 
inquiry in that it may provide additional details and insights into the inner workings and 
strategic intentions of this impenetrable state. That said; an examination of the minor 
relations of the DPRK is of particular importance because contemporary academic 
authorship offers little on this subject. Most writing on North Korean diplomatic relations 
focuses on participants in the Six Party Talks (i.e., China, Russia, Japan, United States, 
and South Korea), or on what some refer to as the Big Four (China, Russia, Japan, and 
the United States), or the Big Four Plus One (i.e., previously listed players plus South 
Korea). While this author contends that good reason exists for the broader foreign policy 
community’s focus on these significant players, an inquiry on what can be learned on the 
periphery of DPRK foreign relations is just as important, and perhaps more important, 
because it largely remains unexplored in contemporary literature. 
To substantiate the importance of DPRK minor relations, it is only necessary to 
look at current news items. In mid-July 2013, the world learned that Cuban-North Korean 
relations remained active when Panama seized a DPRK state owned freighter. Panama 
seized the freighter because it contained Cuban weapons being transported back to North 
Korea for refurbishment, which had been illegally concealed among other cargo.1 
Alternatively, emerging reports of possible DPRK connections to the Syrian chemical 
weapons program can be reviewed.2 These two recent stories indicate a DPRK that 
remains involved, in some measure, in military engagement abroad despite substantial 
United Nations (UN) sanctions. Any insight that can be gained by exploring these 
relations is important to United States (U.S.) national defense and understanding of the 
DPRK state. 
                                                 
1 Rick Gladstone, “North Korea Says Freighter Carried Legal Load of Arms,” New York Times, July 
18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/18/world/americas/north-korean-ship-cuba.html?_r=0. 
2 Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “Chemical Weapons: The North Korean Angle,” North 
Korea: Witness to Transformation Blog, Peterson Institute for International Economics, September 3, 2013, 
http://www.piie.com/blogs/nk/?p=11560; Claudia Rosett, “North Korean-Syrian Chemistry: The Weapons 
Connections,” Forbes, August 19, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/claudiarosett/2013/08/ 
19/north-korean-syrian-chemistry-the-weapons-connections/. 
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Additionally, North Korea continues engagement outside the military sphere. 
While it is not uncommon for the Korean Central News Agency, the state run news 
agency of the DPRK, to report on the various travels of its civilian leaders abroad, recent 
reports have surfaced of high-ranking DPRK civilian leaders visiting African states.3 
While North Korea has historic ties with Africa that date back to the 1960s, an 
examination of the current state and nature of DPRK-African relations is worthy of 
analysis. Such recent press items lead to pondering: why the cash-strapped DPRK still 
sends personnel abroad to engage in diplomatic activities? What motivates these 
activities in the present age? Is it primarily economic? Is it resource based? What drives 
these relations in this period? 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
While many refer to North Korea as a hermit kingdom, its diplomatic relations 
challenge this label. The DPRK has been and remains active diplomatically. This thesis 
demonstrates the relations with many of the states with which the DRPK may consider 
close friends continue to be marked by the rhetoric of a previous era. Thus, more 
continuity than change in its minor foreign relations can be seen; however, signs of new 
life cannot be ignored. While most of its bilateral-minor relations were established to help 
bolster its claim as the sole legitimate government of the Korean Peninsula, these 
relationships have become more important as the DPRK has become increasingly 
isolated. Furthermore, by keeping these relations warm, they assist Pyongyang in its 
possible efforts to engage in diplomatic hedging if needed. Over the years, as 
Pyongyang’s relationship with its primary benefactors has waxed and waned, it has 
engaged in expanded diplomatic efforts. In mid-2013, as China supported efforts for 
more universal application of further restrictive sanctions on the DPRK, the beginning of 
a cooling period in DPRK-PRC relations can be seen. Given this potential waning of 
relations with its sole primary benefactor, the DPRK can be expected to enter into a new 
period of more energetic diplomacy. 
                                                 
3 Jeong Hunny, “North Korea Looks to Africa to Ease Isolation,” Asian News Network, August 18, 
2013, http://www.asianewsnet.net/North-Korea-looks-to-Africa-to-ease-isolation-50441.html; Korean 
Central News Agency of DPRK, “DPRK Government Delegation Arrives in DR Congo,” August 19, 2013 
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.html. 
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In both academic and the broader foreign relations literature, a panoramic survey 
of the DPRK foreign relations does not exists nor does an analysis of the government’s 
motivations focusing on the post-Cold War period. While a handful of surveys have been 
written on the foreign relations of North Korea, they were either written during the Cold 
War or examine only the Cold War period. Additionally, most literature on the DPRK 
foreign relations focuses on modern-day concerns, such as nuclear weapons development 
and illicit arms proliferation issues, and then discusses the relations of the DPRK with a 
small number of states in this context and only addresses its aggregate foreign relations 
tangentially. Typically discussed in this respect is the relationship the DPRK has with the 
Republic of Korea (ROK), the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan, Russia, and the 
United States. This is not to say that the focus of such writings is inappropriate, but more 
attention is needed to some of the more obscure relations that the DPRK maintains. From 
those relations it may be possible to glean knowledge at the margin that may aid in 
understanding the DPRK’s broader foreign policy goals. 
The most closely relevant scholarly work to this thesis is that by Charles 
Armstrong in a paper for the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars titled 
“Juche and North Korea’s Global Aspirations,” and his book, Tyranny of the Weak: 
North Korea and the World, 1959–1992. In these works, Armstrong surveys DPRK 
diplomatic relations through the years. He contends that the DPRK began an aggressive 
diplomatic outreach in the late 1960s that endured into the 1980s. Armstrong posits that 
this remarkable outreach was partly rooted in a DPRK desire to become a leader in the 
third world. He goes as far to say that it was pursuing a “peculiar and limited kind of 
globalization,”4 which foreshadowed the globalization South Korea would undertake in 
the early 1990s. Ultimately, he contends, this diplomatic outreach was doomed to fail 
from the beginning. Employing an argument much in line with logic advanced in George 
                                                 
4 Charles Armstrong, “Juche and North Korea’s Global Aspirations,” working paper, Washington, DC: 
Wilson Center, 2009, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/NKIDP_Working_Paper 
_1_Juche_and_North_Koreas_Global_Aspirations_web.pdf, 1. 
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Kennan’s version of containment,5 the DPRK’s diplomacy was doomed to fail because 
the state itself was and remains riddled with internal contradictions. Specifically, Kim Il 
Sung and the DPRK attempted to market its model of self-reliance, or juche, to other 
states, but the effort was destined to fail because it was only made possible by DPRK 
benefactors and access to the markets that the “socialist universe” provided.”6 Also, the 
effort contradicted the fact that inherent in juche is the idea that the Korean people are a 
unique people. How can juche, something unique to the Korean people, also be applied to 
other people around the world? Ultimately, these factors, combined with the end of the 
Cold War and a rising South Korea, ended any notion of enhanced DPRK diplomatic 
prominence on the international stage by the 1980s.7 
While Dr. Armstrong’s work stands as the most contemporary scholarly work on 
this subject, a handful of other scholars have gone before him.8 Works on this subject all 
in some way offer the same characterization of DPRK foreign relations in the aggregate. 
They assert that DPRK relations were largely compelled by three loose strategic goals: 
legitimacy, security, and development. While all three works have slightly different 
paths, they traverse to arrive at these conclusions; they all conclude that DPRK 
sovereignty is the chief goal of the state. All three works stand as great contributions to 
an underserved area of academia but still do not address DPRK relations in the present.9 
Perhaps the most relevant work found among think tank literature on the subject 
of DPRK diplomatic relations is that of the National Committee on North Korea, a U.S. 
based non-governmental organization. Listing a membership of many notable Korea and 
Northeast Asia scholars, its mission is to promote and facilitate engagement between the 
                                                 
5 George Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1947, http://www.foreign 
affairs.com/articles/23331/x/the-sources-of-soviet-conduct. 
6 Armstrong, “Juche and North Korea’s Global Aspirations,” 15. 
7 Ibid.; Charles Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the World, 1950–1992 (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), 90. 
8 Works pre-dating Dr. Armstrong’s latest book include: Wayne S. Kiyosaki, North Korea’s Foreign 
Relations: The Politics of Accommodation, 1945–75 (Washington, DC: Praeger, 1976); Byung Chul Koh, 
The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); 
Byung Chul Koh and Tae-Hwan Kwak, ed., The Foreign Relations of North Korea: New Perspectives vol. 
1 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987). 
9 Ibid. 
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DPRK and the United States.10
 
In 2012, Daniel Wertz, JJ Oh, and Kim Insung, of the 
National Committee, wrote a survey of DPRK diplomatic relations through the years. 
They break DPRK relations in six distinct periods that begin in 1948: “1948 to 1950s: 
limited diplomatic relationships; late-1950s through 1960s: declaring autonomous 
diplomacy; 1970s: expanded diplomatic outreach; 1980s: terrorism and the collapse of 
the Eastern bloc; 1990s: former Soviet bloc—and outreach to Japan and the U.S.; and 
2000s: the European Union and Six-Party Talks.”11 While the authors do not offer much 
characterization of the individual relations, nor do they make broader assessments based 
on the relationships that the DPRK maintains, they do provide a useful pool of data and a 
historical framework for DPRK relations.12 
While not directly focused on the diplomatic relations of the DPRK, several 
academic works are notable in their contribution to understanding North Korea. Victor 
Cha’s The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future advances the thesis that North 
Korea is entering a period of neojuche.13 He claims that the new leadership of the DPRK 
under Kim Jong Un is trying to find a new legitimacy narrative, given that the old 
ideology under Kim Jong Il was an absolute failure in that the country never became the 
promised “powerful and prosperous nation.”14 As a result, Cha claims that the average 
North Korean views the past with a certain romanticism, and thus, needs a return back to 
what made its country great. He describes neojuche15 as “a return to a harder-line, more 
orthodox juche ideology (defined as self-reliance) of the 1950s and 1960s, when North  
 
 
                                                 
10 The National Committee on North Korea, “Mission,” accessed March 12, 2014, http://www.ncnk. 
org/who-we-are/mission. 
11 Daniel Wertz, JJ Oh, and Kim Insung, “DPRK Diplomatic Relations,” The National Committee on 
North Korea, last modified June 11, 2012, http://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-
papers/dprk-diplomatic-relations. 
12 Ibid. 





Korea saw its best days.”16 If Cha’s thesis is correct, then the period of the 1950s and 
1960s may be reviewed, a period of expanded diplomatic outreach, for explanations 
regarding contemporary DPRK actions. 
As discussed, Cha’s book does not directly address the DPRK diplomatic 
relations in the aggregate. As others have argued, Cha claims that China and the DPRK 
have a unique relationship. In his chapter that addresses DPRK foreign relations, Cha 
advances the idea that China remains “the sole source of external support for the regime 
today.”17 This support is potentially growing less certain, given recent, more unified 
enforcement of UN sanctions, particularly in finance, raising some interesting questions 
regarding the durability of China-DPRK relations. 
Another notable recent work is that of Patrick McEachern’s Inside the Red Box: 
North Korea’s Post-Totalitarian Politics. Published before the 2011 death of Kim Jong Il 
and his son Kim Jong Un’s ascendance to head of the North Korean state, this book 
advances the thesis that the field of international relations (IR) has mislabeled the North 
Korean regime as a totalitarian state under Kim Jong Il. He says that “while Kim Il 
Sung’s rule can be described as totalitarian, Kim Jong Il rules through a more 
decentralized, post-totalitarian, institutionally plural state.”18 This statement, of course, is 
contested by academics like Cheong Seong-chang.19
 While McEachern’s work does not 
address the DPRK under Kim Jong Un, nor does it directly contribute to the inquiry of 
this paper, his work does serve as important reminder that whatever decisions the DPRK 
has pursued diplomatically, they are not necessarily the logical or capricious actions of a 
single actor. Instead, they very well may be the result of internal workings and 
machinations of the DPRK elites and leadership, and as such, must be considered when 
crafting assessments. 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future, 13. 
18 Patrick McEachern, Inside the Red Box: North Korea’s Post-totalitarian Politics (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010), 11. 
19 Frank Ruediger, “North Korea after Kim Jong Il: The Kim Jong Un Era and Its Challenges,” The 
Asia-Pacific Journal 10, no. 2 (2012): 5. 
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E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis begins with a broad historical overview of DPRK relations from its 
establishment in 1948 to the present. This historical overview outlines major themes and 
trends from the past, where those have brought the DPRK state, and also, addresses 
underlying motivations in these relations through the years. 
After a look at the evolution in relations, this thesis addresses the minor 
diplomatic relations of the DPRK state. This portion of the study takes a comprehensive 
look at the main actors out of the minor diplomatic stratum of DRPK relations. It 
addresses what drives these relations in the present and possibly projects the direction in 
which they are headed. Next, it examines DPRK international institution participation. 
Within this section, the thesis explores DPRK levels of activity and what motivates its 
interactions with these various institutions. Lastly, it concludes with a section addressing 
some of the broad themes discovered in this inquiry and may be expected to be seen in 
DPRK diplomatic relations in coming years. 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF DPRK FOREIGN RELATIONS 
A. ORIGINS OF THE DPRK STATE 
Before exploring the minor diplomatic relations of North Korea, it is first 
necessary to understand how the DPRK came into existence in 1948. North Korea was 
birthed out of conflict, but conflict was nothing new to the Korean Peninsula. Some 
historians have compared its plight to that of Poland–the geographical misfortune of 
serving as ill-fated middle ground for surrounding warring powers.20 Others have 
described it as the epicenter of shifting tectonic plates at which the interests of Great 
Powers converge.21 Regardless of which analogy is more fitting, the peninsula, 
particularly in the last century, has seen much transition and conflict. It hosted a good 
measure of conflict throughout the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese war, and later, became a 
protectorate of Japan in 1905 as a result of the Russo-Japanese War. In 1910, Japan 
annexed and declared it a colony of Japan, and it remained so throughout World War II 
until being partially occupied by Soviet troops in 1945 shortly after the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) entered the war against Japan. U.S. troops would soon also 
occupy part of the peninsula and remain separated from Soviet troops by the thirty-eighth 
parallel. The Soviets maintaining troops in the north found the former leader of the anti-
Japanese guerilla forces turned statesman Kim Il Sung to be an enthusiastic client after he 
was installed in October 1945.22 
The peninsula remained divided, and in many ways, reflected the polarization 
underway in the early days of Cold War Europe. Both U.S. and Soviet troops withdrew 
from the peninsula by mid-1949, which left the peninsula led by two nationalistic leaders, 
Kim Il Sung in the north, and Syngman Rhee in the south. Neither leader was pleased 
with the divided state of Korea, and both harbored dreams of reunification by any means 
necessary, including force. Dating as far back as 1949, Kim Il Sung petitioned support for 
                                                 
20 Alice Lyman Miller and Richard Wich, Becoming Asia: Change and Continuity in Asian 
International relations Since World War II (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 65. 
21 Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the World, 1950–1992, 10. 
22 Miller and Wich, Becoming Asia, 66. 
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an invasion of the south to the leader of his state’s primary benefactor, Joseph Stalin. 
Stalin, after much persistence on the part of Kim Il Sung, and in no small part due to 
confusing strategic signaling from Washington, finally acquiesced to Kim’s invasion 
ambitions of the south.23 This invasion led to the Korean War, which in the end, dragged 
the newly formed People’s Republic of China (PRC) into direct action with U.S. and UN 
forces. The war ended short of any grand ambition of a reconciled peninsula and largely 
returned Korea to the status quo antebellum. An armistice was signed between the United 
Nations and the DPRK on July 27, 1953. It called for the establishment of the Korean 
demilitarized zone (DMZ), which continues to serve as the de facto border between the 
DPRK and the ROK to this day. With no mutually agreed upon mechanism established 
for political collaboration between the North and the South, the border remains one of the 
most hotly contested regions on the globe.24 
North Korea and Kim Il Sung’s relationship with the USSR and the PRC ebbed 
and flowed through the years. The North under Kim’s direction became very adept at 
playing off the rivalries between to two communist powers depending on what the DPRK 
needed and the state of relations between the USSR and the PRC.25 
B. DRPK RELATIONS: 1948–PRESENT 
1. 1948–1957: Only Fraternal Bonds Will Do26 
At its inception, given that North Korea’s two largest benefactors were 
communist states, its official diplomatic relations was limited to Soviet satellite states. 
Table 1 shows the official diplomatic relations of North Korea from 1948–1957. 
 
                                                 
23 Miller and Wich, Becoming Asia, 66; As Miller and Wich argue, the historic record has revealed in 
recent years that neither Washington nor Moscow were anxious to enter into conflict on the peninsula 
through direct action or proxy. Instead, a clear case can be made the great powers were pulled into the 
Korean War by their respective beneficiary states. This theme remains in play to this day; a relatively weak 
state, North Korea, drawing an inordinate amount of attention and resources from the great powers. 
24 Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak, 10; Bruce Cumings, The Korean War (New York: Random 
House, 2010), 143–146; Miller and Wich, Becoming Asia, 66. 
25 Cha, The Impossible State, 315. 
26 The periodization blocks used in this paper are drawn from the work of Wertz, Oh, and Insung, 
“DPRK Diplomatic Relations.”  
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Table 1.   Official Diplomatic Relations of the DPRK: 1948–195727 
Country Relations Established Country Relations Established 
USSR 10/12/1948 Hungary 11/11/1948 
Mongolia 10/15/1948 Albania 11/29/1948 
Poland 10/16/1948 Bulgaria 11/29/1948 
Czechoslovakia 10/16/1948 PRC 10/6/1949 
Yugoslavia 10/30/1948 East Germany 1949 
Romania 11/3/1948 North Vietnam 1/31/1950 
The USSR was the first to recognize the DPRK and establish official diplomatic 
ties in 1948. This recognition paved the way for an instant wave of Soviet satellite states 
also to recognize the DPRK. Immediately apparent upon viewing the table is the limited 
nature of the DPRKs official relations. By comparison, the PRC, whose recognition as 
the legitimate government of China was also limited, maintained official diplomatic 
relations with 28 states to the DPRK’s 12. See Table 2. 
Table 2.   Official Diplomatic Relations of the PRC: 1948–195728 
Country Relations Established Country Relations Established 
USSR 10/3/1949 Sweden 5/9/1950 
Bulgaria 10/4/1949 Denmark 5/11/1950 
Romania 10/5/1949 Burma  6/8/1950 
Hungary 10/6/1949 Swiss Confederation 9/14/1950 
DPRK 10/6/1949 Liechtenstein 9/14/1950 
Czechoslovakia 10/6/1949 Finland 10/28/1950 
Poland 10/7/1949 Pakistan 5/21/1951 
Mongolia 10/16/1949 Norway 10/5/1954 
East Germany 10/27/1949 Yugoslavia 1/2/1955 
                                                 
27 Wertz, Oh, and Insung, “DPRK Diplomatic Relations.” 
28 John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China (Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1993), 82. 
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Country Relations Established Country Relations Established 
Albania 11/23/1949 Afghanistan 1/20/1955 
India 1/1/1950 Nepal 8/1/1955 
United Kingdom 1/6/1950 Egypt 5/30/1956 
North Vietnam  1/18/1950 Syria  8/1/1956 
Indonesia 4/13/1950 Yemen  9/24/1956 
While North Korea’s diplomatic relations would grow in terms of numbers in the years to 
come, this period provides a foreshadowing of the isolated nature of the North Korean 
state and the markedly different path it would take from its strong communist neighbor 
and its democratic rival to the south. 
While DPRK relations in aggregate may have been lower than the PRC’s, it 
nevertheless maintained more than its neighbor to the south (see Table 3) in this period, a 
significant comparison given the undecided state of the battle for supremacy on the 
peninsula under way at this time. In the contest for legitimacy on the international stage 
between the DPRK and ROK governments, at least in terms of the numbers of states that 
officially recognized Pyongyang diplomatically, the DPRK had a quantitative edge over 
the South. While the balance shifted in coming years, this quantitative edge was 
meaningful in the time immediately preceding both states’ entry into the international 
system. 
Table 3.   Official Diplomatic Relations of the ROK: 1948–195729 
Country Relations Established Country Relations Established 
USA 10/12/1948 West Germany 12/1/1955 
ROC 1/4/1949 South Vietnam 1956 
UK 1/18/1949 Italy 11/24/1956 
France 2/15/1949 Turkey 3/8/1957 
Philippines 3/3/1949 
                                                 
29 Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea, 12. 
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2. Late 1950s–1960s: Diplomatic Hedging 
In the late 1950s, North Korea entered into a period of diplomacy no longer 
dictated by its benefactors, but instead, marked by a level of autonomy. Throughout the 
late 1950s and into the 1960s, profound changes were occurring globally, especially in 
the communist world. Despite the fact that the DPRK had joined the PRC in denouncing 
Soviet “revisionism” after Nikita Khrushchev’s pursuit of “peaceful coexistence” with 
the West, the DPRK moved away from China and closer again to the USSR, which was 
largely because the Cultural Revolution was under way (1966–1976) in China. Also, 
during this time, increasing solidarity emerged amongst the developing world as a result 
of the nonaligned movement that had its foundation laid at the 1955 Bandung 
conference.30 While the DPRK was not invited to the Bandung conference, its official 
press covered the event positively and it would later seem to adopt the idea of third-world 
solidarity and greatly expand its diplomatic relations in this period.31 The Algerian 
National Liberation Front was the first non-Marxist regime with which the DPRK 
established diplomatic relations, as seen in Table 4.32 Additionally, throughout this 
period, de-colonization was occurring globally that left new countries with which North 
Korea could establish relations. 
Table 4.   Newly Established Diplomatic Relations of the DPRK: 
Late 1950s–1960s33 
Country Relations Established Country Relations Established 
Algeria 9/25/1958 Tanzania 1/13/1965 
Guinea 10/8/1958 Syria 7/25/1966 
Cuba 8/29/1960 Burundi 3/12/1967 
Mali 8/29/1961 Somalia 4/13/1967 
                                                 
30 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1953–1960 Bandung Conference 
(Asian-African Conference), 1955,” accessed June 30, 2013, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-
1960/BandungConf. 
31 Armstrong, “Juche and North Korea’s Global Aspirations,” 4. 
32 Wertz, Oh, and Insung, “DPRK Diplomatic Relations.” 
33 Ibid. 
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Country Relations Established Country Relations Established 
Yemen 3/9/1963 Iraq 1968 
Egypt 8/24/1963 South Yemen 1968 
Indonesia 4/16/1964 Equatorial Guinea 1/30/1969 
Mauritania 11/12/1964 Zambia 4/12/1969 
Congo Rep. 12/24/1964 Chad 5/8/1969 
Cambodia 12/28/1964 Sudan 6/21/1969 
Ghana 12/28/1964 Central African Republic 9/5/1969 
North Korea during this period first launched an all-out effort to establish 
diplomatic ties with these countries in particular, which would come to fruition in the 
1970s because these new countries were gaining membership in the United Nations and 
could assist North Korea in matters left to the UN general assembly. Thus, a desire to win 
voting support in the United Nations partially drove this broadened diplomatic 
outreach.34 
3. 1970s: DPRK’s Diplomatic Coming Out 
Much of the outreach the DPRK had conducted through the 1960s would be 
realized in the 1970s with further expansion of diplomatic relations (see Table 5). In this 
period, Kim Il Sung marketed the DPRK state as the model for third world development. 
This narrative had real resonance with those countries that had only gained independence 
several short years ago. Many of these states viewed the DPRK as a nation that had 
broken free of imperialism, built an industrialized economy, defeated a superpower, and 
was now gaining prominence on the world stage. Charles Armstrong provides his 
perspective, and a notable Kim Il Sung quote, in a working paper authored for the North 
Korea International Documentation Project titled, “Juche and North Korea’s Global 
Aspirations:” 
                                                 
34 Jide Owoeye, “The Metamorphosis of North Korea’s African Policy,” Asian Survey 31, no. 7 
(1991): 632; Kiyosaki, North Korea’s Foreign Relations, 44–86; Wertz, Oh, and Insung, “DPRK 
Diplomatic Relations.” 
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The DPRK portrayed the North Koreans’ struggle against the US and 
South Korea as identical with the struggle of Third-World peoples for 
independence, and completely compatible with ‘proletarian 
internationalism’: ‘We should unite closely with the peoples of all the 
socialist countries; we should actively support the Asian, African and 
Latin American peoples struggling to throw off the imperialist yoke, and 
strengthen solidarity with them.’ This revolutionary spirit was very much 
in sync with a good many movements for Third World solidarity in the 
age of decolonization.35 








Maldives 6/14/1970 Malaysia 6/30/1973 Botswana 12/27/1974 
Sri Lanka 7/15/1970 Denmark 7/17/1973 Australia 12/31/1974 
Sierra Leone 10/14/1971 Iceland 7/27/1973 Portugal 4/15/1975 
Malta 12/20/1971 Bangladesh 12/9/1973 Thailand 5/8/1975 
Cameroon 3/3/1972 India 12/10/1973 Kenya 5/12/1975 
Rwanda 4/22/1972 Liberia 12/20/1973 Ethiopia 6/5/1975 
Chile 6/1/1972 Afghanistan 12/26/1973 Mozambique 6/25/1975 
Uganda 8/2/1972 Argentina 1973 Tunisia 8/3/1975 
Senegal 9/8/1972 Libya 1/23/1974 São Tomé 8/9/1975 
Burkina 
Faso 
10/11/1972 Gabon 1/29/1974 Cape Verde 8/18/1975 




3/16/1974 Comoros 11/13/1975 
Zaire 12/15/1972 Nepal 5/15/1974 Angola 11/16/1975 
Togo 1/31/1973 Guyana 5/18/1974 Myanmar 1975 
Benin 2/5/1973 Laos 6/24/1974 Nigeria 5/25/1976 




                                                 
35 Armstrong, “Juche and North Korea’s Global Aspirations,” 5–6. 








Mauritius 3/16/1973 Niger 9/6/1974 Seychelles 6/28/1976 
Sweden 4/7/1973 Jamaica 10/9/1974 Barbados 12/5/1977 
Iran 4/15/1973 Venezuela 10/28/1974 Grenada 5/9/1979 
Finland 6/1/1973 Austria 12/17/1974 Nicaragua 8/21/1979 
Norway 6/22/1973 Switzerland 12/20/1974 Saint Lucia 9/13/1979 
During this period, the DPRK established relations with 63 countries. It also 
joined the World Health Organization later in 1975, gained entry into the Non-Aligned 
Movement, and established an observer mission at the Union Nations. Much of the 1970s 
would be the highpoint of DPRK diplomatic outreach, but by the end of the decade, due 
to several scandals involving DPRK diplomats engaged in drug smuggling and its 
continued support of revolutionary groups in numerous countries, its overall momentum 
in world affairs and relations with other nations started to wane.37 
4. 1980s: Diplomatic Bleakness 
Throughout the 1980s, the establishment of new diplomatic relations nearly 
halted. Both world affairs and North Korea’s actions were responsible for this slowing. 
North Korea engaged in two significant acts of terrorism in this decade. First, in 1983, 
DPRK agents attempted to assassinate ROK President Chun Doo-hwan in Rangoon, 
Burma. While the attack proved unsuccessful in eliminating its primary target, it did kill 
the majority of Chun’s cabinet and led to both Burma and South Korea breaking all forms 
of diplomatic relations with North Korea. Additionally, the North Korean bombing of 
commercial airliner Korean Air Flight 858 in 1987 further drove the DPRK into 
international isolation and led to it being labeled a terrorist state, which also occurred 
during a period of increasing South Korean economic affluence that directly impact its 
relations with other states. 
 
                                                 
37 Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak, 168; Wertz, Oh, and Insung, “DPRK Diplomatic Relations.” 
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Table 6.   Newly Established Diplomatic Relations of the DPRK: 
1980s38 
Country Relations Established Country Relations Established 
Zimbabwe 4/18/1980 Suriname 10/11/1982 
Lesotho 7/19/1980 Côte d’Ivoire 1/9/1985 
Mexico 9/9/1980 Trinidad and Tobago 1/22/1986 
Lebanon 2/12/1981 Columbia 10/24/1988 
Vanuatu 10/1/1981 Peru 12/15/1988 
Nauru 2/25/1982 Morocco 2/13/1989 
Malawi 6/25/1982   
Using its increasing economic wealth, the ROK scored a major diplomatic victory 
through its Nordpolitik engagement with Eastern European bloc countries. These states 
diplomatically recognized the ROK and put an end to their policies of exclusive 
recognition of Pyongyang. This recognition, in some measure, served as the preamble for 
the USSR and the PRC to recognize the ROK formally in the 1990s.39 
5. 1990s: A New World 
The 1990s got off to bad start for the DPRK in that its two historical benefactors 
would both officially recognize the ROK by 1992. This period was largely marked by 
shifting global power dynamics with the end of the Cold War. No longer would ideology 
trump economic considerations, as evidenced with the almost instant recognition of the 
ROK government by Russia in 1990. In a rather pragmatic step, the DPRK joined the 
United Nations concurrently with the ROK in 1991. As the eastern bloc fell, the DPRK 
worked quickly to establish relations with the newly formed states. DPRK diplomacy 
abroad soon confronted very real limitations in funding with the reduction of backing 
from the former USSR. This decrease in aid led to economic hardship on a number of 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 238–270; Wertz, Oh, and Insung, “DPRK Diplomatic Relations.” 
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fronts in North Korea, and directly hurt its presence abroad, as it was forced to shutter 
thirty percent of its embassies.40 
Table 7.   Newly Established Official Diplomatic Relations of the 
DPRK: 1990s41 
Country Relations Established Country Relations Established 
Namibia 3/22/1990 Tajikistan 2/5/92 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 8/16/1990 Uzbekistan 2/7/92 
Antigua & Barbuda 11/27/1990 Armenia 2/13/92 
Dominica 1/21/1991 Oman 5/20/92 
Bahamas 5/16/1991 Slovenia 9/8/92 
Belize 6/20/1991 Croatia 11/30/92 
Lithuania 9/25/1991 Czech Republic 1/1/93 
Latvia 9/26/1991 Slovakia 1/1/93 
St. Kitts and Nevis 12/13/1991 Qatar 1/11/93 
Cyprus 12/23/1991 Eritrea 5/25/93 
Ukraine 1/9/1992 Djibouti 6/13/93 
Turkmenistan 1/10/1992 Macedonia 11/2/93 
Kyrgyzstan 1/21/1992 Georgia 11/3/94 
Kazakhstan 1/28/1992 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1/19/96 
Azerbaijan 1/30/1992 South Africa 8/10/98 
Moldova 1/30/1992 Brunei 1/7/99 
Belarus 2/3/1992   
The power dynamics of the post-Cold War world forced the DPRK to be more 
pragmatic than ever. Given the changing security environment, North Korea first entered 
into nuclear talks with the United States in the 1990s, largely seeking security guarantees 
from the United States if it agreed to halt its nuclear program and disassemble existing 
nuclear facilities. The DPRK also entered into talks with Japan to normalize relations and 
                                                 
40 Wertz, Oh, and Insung, “DPRK Diplomatic Relations.” 
41 Ibid. 
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discussed compensations for Japanese actions during the colonial period. Lastly, also 
notable in this period, was the death of Kim Il Sung on July 8, 1994. For the first time, 
someone other than its founder would rule North Korea; however, as the world would 
soon learn, any predictions of immediate collapse after Kim Il Sung’s death would prove 
to be unfounded. Enduring economic catastrophe, natural disasters, and famine through 
the latter half of the decade, Kim Jong Il and his elites remained in power.42 
6. 2000–Present: Rapprochement to Modern Pariah State 
While diplomatically the 1990s were a bleak period, the early 2000s opened with 
promise. A number of promising signs arose that the DPRK was ready to become a 
normalized member of the international community. Kim Jong Il had publicly expressed 
a desire to open dialogue with capitalist countries, its nuclear program appeared to be 
halted, and the Koreas had successfully concluded their first inter-Korean summit in 
2000. 
Concurrently, as seen in Table 8, North Korea had successfully established 
diplomatic ties with a number of European countries. 
Table 8.   Newly Established Official Diplomatic Relations of the 
DPRK: 2000s43 
Country Relations Established Country Relations Established 
Italy 1/4/00 Liechtenstein 5/2/01 
Philippines 7/12/00 EU 5/14/01 
United Kingdom 12/12/00 Bahrain 5/23/01 
Netherlands 1/15/01 Turkey 6/27/01 
Belgium 1/23/01 East Timor 11/5/02 
Canada 2/6/01 Ireland 12/10/03 
Spain 2/7/01 San Marino 5/13/04 
Germany 3/1/01 Montenegro 7/16/07 
                                                 
42 Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak, 282–288; Wertz, Oh, and Insung, “DPRK Diplomatic Relations.” 
43 Wertz, Oh, and Insung, “DPRK Diplomatic Relations.” 
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Luxembourg 3/5/01 UAE 9/17/07 
Greece 3/8/01 Swaziland 9/20/07 
Brazil 3/9/01 Dominica Rep. 9/24/07 
New Zealand 3/26/01 Guatemala 9/26/07 
Kuwait 4/4/01 South Sudan 11/18/11 
Additionally, adding to its newly reacquired international prestige, North Korea 
hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin, and then also hosted Japanese Prime Minister 
Koizumi. Both these visits were a badge of honor for the DPRK as no Soviet, Russian 
Federation, or Japanese leaders had visited Pyongyang previously. These visits were 
capped by the fall 2000 visit of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. The air of 
promise, however, did not last long. In late 2002—largely due to the Bush’s 
administration’s rejection of Clinton administration’s approach to the DPRK44—the 
Agreed Framework between the United States and DPRK faltered. Thereafter, the six-
party talks proved to be increasingly volatile and endure periods of fragile success to 
hopelessness; all the while, relations continued to degrade.45 Even while six-party talks 
were at a standstill, North Korea did reestablish ties with Myanmar, which had previously 
been severed by then-Burma due to the DPRK assassination attempt on the visiting ROK 
president in 1983.46 
In addition to the stalling of the six-party talks in this period, North Korea 
engaged in military acts that threatened to destabilize the peninsula even further. In 2010, 
the North sunk the ROK Corvette Cheonan, and then later, rained artillery shells on the 
ROK island of Yeonpyoeng. Remarkably, these two incidents did not lead to war or the 
severing of diplomatic relations. France, after this incident, still one of the only European 
                                                 
44 The Bush administration took a very different approach to the DPRK particularly after the events of 
September 11, 2001. In the age of the U.S.’ war on terror, a much harsher tone in foreign policy towards 
“rogue states” was adopted, which was articulated in President Bush’s State of the Union speech in 2002, 
which labeled North Korea as part of the “Axis of Evil.” The post-9/11 polices of the Bush administration 
amounted to a radical departure from the Clinton administration’s approach to the DPRK, which largely 
complemented ROK President Kim Dae-chung’s sunshine policy. 
45 Wertz, Oh, and Insung, “DPRK Diplomatic Relations.” 
46 Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak, 282–290; Wertz, Oh, and Insung, “DPRK Diplomatic Relations.” 
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countries not to have official diplomatic ties with North Korea, in 2011, announced plans 
to open a cultural bureau in the North Korean capital to better support French non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the DPRK.47 
In 2011, Kim Jong Il passed due to exhaustion for being about the people’s work 
for so many years—at least this was the DPRK’s official interpretation.48 His death 
ushered in a new leader, Kim Jong Un. The world does not know much about the son of 
Kim Jong Il; however, thus far, Kim does seems to be deviating very little from what the 
world has come to expect from a DPRK head of state. Presently, no indication has been 
seen of a change in focus in DPRK diplomatic relations. The official webpage of the 
DPRK still reads very much as if it were following the external diplomatic push of Kim Il 
Sung in the 1960–70s: 
On the principle of independence the Government of the Republic 
promotes friendship and cooperation with the various countries of the 
world and makes positive efforts to destroy the old international order of 
domination and subjugation, establish a new one, based on equality, 
justice and fairness and develop the South-South[49] cooperation on the 
principle of collective self-reliance.50 
Additionally, little variation appears to be happening in the uniquely branded DPRK 
provocation negotiation style: commit provocative act, endure new sanctions, and wait 
for concessions. Beginning signs have surfaced that this type of negotiating ploy may no 
longer work in the latest round of sanctions placed on North Korea this past spring, but 
what kind of impact they will have long-term is hard to tell at this juncture. 
                                                 
47 Wertz, Oh, and Insung, “DPRK Diplomatic Relations.” 
48 British Broadcast Company, “North Korea: Kim Jong-il’s Death Is Announced on State TV,” 
December 18, 2011, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16240002. 
49 Some may be confused by the “South-South” reference. This author assumes that this passage refers 
to DPRK relations with the Global South given the DPRK’s history of relations with countries of the Non-
Aligned Movement. 
50 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, “Foreign Relations,” accessed July 1, 2013, 
http://www.korea-dpr.com/relations.html. 
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III. MINOR RELATIONS OF THE DPRK IN THE PRESENT 
A. OVERVIEW OF CURRENT MINOR RELATIONS 
Returning to the main theme of this thesis, this chapter explores in greater detail 
the minor relations of the DPRK. Many of the DPRK’s relations continue to be defined 
by its past. Throughout its relations, a common thread can be seen, a singular 
uncompromising desire to be recognized as the sole rightful government on the Korean 
Peninsula and preservation of its sovereignty. While the DPRK remains a jealous 
guardian of its sovereignty, another theme evident in the evolution of DPRK’s relations is 
an acknowledgment that other states and international bodies will, in some measure, 
decide its contest for international recognition as the only legitimate government on the 
peninsula. Thus, can be seen a state that is not all together impervious to outside 
pressures from other states and institutions, but rather, one influenced by these pressures. 
Given the DPRK’s desire for broad recognition, all relations are important at the 
macro level; however, at the micro level, not all relationships are equal. This thesis now 
attempts to narrow down those minor relations and provide granularity to those assessed 
as most important to the DPRK. 
In an attempt to help determine which minor relations are most important to the 
DPRK, this author chose to focus on press reports from the Korean Central News Agency 
(KCNA). The KCNA is the official state-run news agency of the Worker’s Party of 
Korea. Established in 1946, it continues to serve as one of the DPRK’s primary methods 
of transmitting information to the outside world that is in contrast to the DPRK’s other 
major media conduit, the Rodong Sinmun, which is more oriented towards a domestic 
audience primarily consisting of the party and general populace. Like many things in 
North Korea, its media exists in great contrast with much of the rest of the world. Where 
much of the world possesses a free or semi-free press, North Korea continues to maintain 
direct control over its media. For this reason, it is possible to review the various press 
releases of the DPRK and expect they have undergone significant official vetting before  
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being released for publication or broadcast. In this regard, nothing unofficial is released 
in the DPRK press. All press can in some measure be interpreted as the official position 
of Kim Jong Un, the DPRK, and its ruling elites.51 
Given that the KCNA is the official externally orientated news organ of the 
DPRK, valuable information can be extracted regarding DPRK minor foreign relations. 
The KCNA has almost daily stories about various diplomatic exchanges. These 
exchanges range from gifts that Kim Jong Un receives to official bilateral agreements. 
Valuable insight into the nature and substance of these bilateral relations is gained 
through these press accounts. 
Even though valuable insight may be gained by examining these press accounts, it 
is necessary to remain cognizant of the inherent biases present in this type of inquiry. 
Perhaps the strongest bias in this type of inquiry rests in that the stories that the KCNA 
decides to run must be used. Given the control the regime and its apparatus enjoy over 
the press, it must be assumed that the stories released are designed to portray the regime 
in a positive manner or are intended to shape either domestic or international opinion. 
Given this press control, any KCNA story cannot be considered as the whole truth. While 
these stories must be used with caution, this type of bias can be controlled for by 
examining other press accounts. For example, if the KCNA runs a story on a diplomatic 
exchange, it is useful to examine the other country’s press or official foreign affairs office 
materials to corroborate the KCNA story. By no means is this method of inquiry and the 
data it produces free from biases, but by remaining cognizant of potential biases and 
attempts to control for them, they should have a negligible impact on any conclusions. 
The aggregation of these official press reports can also result in some conclusions. 
By looking at the number of times a country’s name appears in the press, assumptions 
can be drawn as to the importance of that state to the DPRK. For example, from January 
1997 to January 2014, the United States is mentioned 3,590 times, Russia 5,700, Japan 
6,660, China 8,300, and not surprisingly, most frequently, is South Korea, which is 
                                                 
51 Korean Central News Agency of DPRK, “Introduction to KCNA,” accessed July 1, 2013, 
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm. 
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referenced 11,800 in this period.52 These numbers are in great contrast to those states on 
the lower end of the spectrum, like Liberia, which is mentioned nine times, and 
Liechtenstein, which is featured only six times in the previously defined 17-year period. 
When viewed across the regions, few states stand out due to the number of times they are 
mentioned in the KCNA. See Figure 1. While this author is quick to acknowledge that 
these numbers must be viewed and employed with caution, it is possible to have a sense 
of which countries are most important to the DPRK within the minor foreign relations 
stratum. 
                                                 
52 These numbers are derived from queries of the Japan-based KCNA server that can be found at 
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Figure 1.  Global: Countries Maintaining Ambassador Level Relations with the DPRK 
and Receiving Most Mentions in KCNA53 
This section limits its inquiry to those countries that have ambassador-level 
relations with the DPRK. As might be expected, where a country decides to place 
diplomatic assets is a good indicator of which bilateral relations it finds most important. 
In the DPRK case, funding from diplomatic ventures must be assumed to be a premium, 
and it is a reasonable assessment that placement of ambassadors is a strategic calculated 
decision that speaks to the importance and commitment of the DPRK to that country.  
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Given this assessment, this section has a particular focus on those countries with 
designated DPRK ambassadors and an even greater focus on those countries with a 
DPRK ambassador in residence. 
1. Americas 
In 1987, Manwoo Lee, in the anthology The Foreign Relations of North Korea: 
New Perspectives, offered the following characterization of DPRK relations with Latin 
America.  
Prior to the 1960s, Latin America was of no interest to North Korea. After 
the success of the Cuban revolution, North Korea became interested in the 
growing nationalistic and political ferment that might weaken the United 
States’ influence in Latin America. North Korea sees in the region much 
potential for the successful anti-imperialist and national liberation 
struggles . . . . [S]he sees a certain American parallel between South Korea 
and many of the Central and Latin American nations dominated by 
conservative armed forces and U.S. interests. Finally, North Korea views 
Cuba and Nicaragua as heroic nations that have successfully assaulted the 
U.S. presence and interests in the Caribbean and Central America.54 
Arguably, much of what is contained in this passage holds true to this day. Even in the 
present, the KCNA is filled with words of solidarity for the revolutionary causes in the 
Americas. Until recently, this support largely appeared to be the DPRK propaganda 
machine on auto-pilot; however, real evidence suggests that in some way, strong 
connections remain in the region that have endured despite the markedly different 
international environments. 
Despite the dire economic state of the DPRK, it maintains a diplomatic presence 
throughout the Americas. North Korea has ambassadorial level representation with the 
countries of Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Trinidad, Venezuela, and the United Nations in New 
York. At first glance, it may appear impressive that the DPRK maintains relations with 
13 states and one intergovernmental organization, but its ambassadors, while resident in 
                                                 
54 Manwoo Lee, “North Korea and Latin America,” in The Foreign Relations of North Korea: New 
Perspectives, ed. Jae Kyu Park, Byung Chul Koh, and Tae-Hwan Kwak (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1987), 411–421. 
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one country, must oversee the affairs of multiple countries. While having a designated 
ambassador—even though not necessarily in residence in the country—is better than no 
ambassador at all. Not having an ambassador in permanent residence undoubtedly 
decreases the amount of interaction between the ambassador and a given state in which 
the ambassador does not reside.55 See Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Americas: Countries Maintaining Ambassador Level Relations with the 
DPRK56 
                                                 
55 Wertz, Oh, and Insung, “DPRK Diplomatic Relations.” 
56 These numbers are derived from queries of the Japan-based KCNA server 
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a. Cuba 
Cuba continues to stand as the DPRK’s most important bilateral relationship in 
the Americas. Partial evidence shows that Cuba is one of only four countries in the region 
to have a DPRK ambassador in residence. Additional evidence of the uniqueness of this 
bond may be found in the 2,000 times Cuba has been mentioned in the KCNA from 
January 1997 to 2014. DPRK-Cuban relations date back to 1960 when the DPRK made 
its first real push to expand diplomatic relations in a period that this author has previously 
referred to as a time of diplomatic hedging. In many ways, the events of the Cuban 
missile crisis and Khrushchev’s decision to back away from an all-out conflict with the 
United States pushed the DPRK more firmly in Beijing’s orbit and formed a bond 
between the DPRK and Cuba. This dyadic bond was strengthened by the idea that both 
were smaller powers fighting a larger imperial power (i.e., the United States) and neither 
could trust on the promise of Moscow’s assistance in a potential fight with the United 
States.57 Over the years, they have cooperated in nearly every major area of relations 
ranging from cultural to military exchanges. That said, the bond has largely been 
ceremonial and one marked by rhetoric over substance, but since Raul Castro took over 
in 2008, some increase in both commercial and military ties has occurred.58 Evidence of 
this relationship could be seen in the summer of 2013 when a North Korean ship with 
illegal military cargo mixed in with a sugar shipment was interdicted by Panamanian 
authorities. 
While the outside world understood that some measure of military relations 
existed between the DPRK and Cuba, few details were available that delve into the extent 
of these relations. Until however, on July 22, 2013, when Panamanian authorities 
investigated the Chong Chon Gang and discovered fighter jets, jet engines, and 
dissembled rockets. After the seizure, the Cuban government was quick to claim that all 
                                                 
57 Kiyosaki, North Korea’s Foreign Relations, 81. 
58 Korean Central News Agency of DPRK, “Economic Cooperation Between DPRK and Cuba,” 
November 12, 2000, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2000/200011/news11/12.htm; Korean Central News 
Agency of DPRK, “Talks Between DPRK, Cuban Military Delegations Held,” July 1, 2013, 
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201307/news02/20130702-21ee.html; Economist Blog, “The Cuban 
Connection,” December 15, 2013, http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2013/12/cuban-
relations-north-korea. 
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the military hardware onboard the ship was outdated and being sent to North Korea for 
refurbishment; however, reports have stated that the jets had fresh fuel still present in 
their tanks and their logs revealed they had recently flown before shipment.59 
This shipment reveals a few significant details about the DPRK and its minor 
relations. First, it is yet another data point demonstrating that that the DPRK continues to 
contravene UN Security Council Resolution 1874. Additionally, it reveals what may 
likely be a mature weapons exchange program between Cuba and the DPRK. It is a 
reasonable assumption that other exchanges of military hardware have occurred, likely in 
both directions. It also reveals that on some level, the current sanctions against North 
Korea are working and those choosing to disregard Resolution 1874 likely share some 
sort of international pariah status with the DPRK. Furthermore, this shipment reveals that 
potentially this relationship is more than a mere relic of an era in which the DPRK 
wished to foment troubles for the “imperialist aggressor,” the United States, in its 
backyard. It reveals that the bond that Cuba and the DPRK share on the fringe of the 
international systems is one of substantive exchange. It is easy to view the bombastic 
rhetoric contained within the press of both Cuba and the DPRK and become lulled into 
era gone by, but just because the rhetoric may be dated does not mean that new life is not 
present.  
The Cuba-DPRK bond that has stood the test of time must continue to be 
monitored for these new signs of life. While this most recent case of weapons transfer 
appears rather benign given the age and type of weapons included in the attempted 
transfer, it demonstrates that military technology is shared between the two states. The 
DPRK, despite its vast coffers of dated military technology, does possess an impressive 
array of missile technology. From surface to air missiles to ballistic missiles, the DPRK 
could transfer materials to Cuba that could decidedly place the U.S. homeland at greater  
 
 
                                                 
59 Economist Blog, “The Cuban Connection;” Carl Meacham, “Smuggling Cuban Weapons through 
the Panama to North Korea,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 23, 2013, http://csis.org/ 
publication/smuggling-cuban-weapons-through-panama-canal-north-korea. 
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risk. Understanding the true nature of military relations and the full extent of weapons 
transfers between these two countries must remain a critical task for the U.S. intelligence 
community. 
2. Europe and Central Asia 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia have ties with the DPRK that date back to the 
early days of the Cold War. The DPRK was quickly recognized by a number of states in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia regions due to affiliations with the former Soviet Union. 
Western Europe and the European Union’s (EU) relations with the DRPK did not begin 
until the year 2001. Almost universal recognition from the states of Western Europe 
occurred largely at the prompting of ROK President Kim Dae-jung in line with the 
sunshine policies of the ROK from 1998–2008. While little in terms of substance is seen 
in DPRK relations between Eastern Europe and Central Asia in the present age, 
significant exchanges between the DPRK and Western Europe remain. 
Western Europe and the European Union continue to maintain a number of 
important connections to the DPRK. First, since 1995, the European Union and its 
member states have provided nearly $500m dollars in direct aid.60 Additionally, it 
continues to hold annual political talks with North Korea in areas of what it refers to as 
“critical engagement.”61 It defines those areas as “peace and security in the Korean 
Peninsula,” “non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,” and “human rights.”62 Lastly, trade 
between the European Union states and the DPRK remains critical to North Korea. 
According to the CIA The World Fact Book, using 2011 data, the European Union 
imports to the DRPK rank third after China and South Korea at 4 percent.63 According to 
                                                 
60 European Union, “EU Relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea),” 
accessed March 8, 2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/korea_north/index_en.htm. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Fact Book: North Korea,” March 4, 2014, https://www. 
cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html. 
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a July 2013 EU report in terms of total trade volume (i.e., both exports and imports), the 
European Union is the DPRK’s eighth top-trading partner.64 
Similar to DPRK diplomatic-corps management of the Americas, most 
ambassadors manage diplomatic relations with several countries. Despite having 
ambassadorial level relations with 52 countries in the region, the DPRK only maintains 
15 ambassadors in the region (for a detailed list of states please see footnote65).66 See 
Figure 3. 
                                                 
64 European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, European Union, Trade in Goods with North 
Korea, July 11, 2013, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113428.pdf. 
65 The DPRK has ambassador level relations with Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Great 
Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and the United Nations in France (United Nations Education, Science, 
and Cultural Organization, UNESCO), Geneva, and Vienna. Similar to DPRK diplomatic-corps 
management of the Americas, most ambassadors manage diplomatic relations with several countries. 
Despite having ambassadorial level relations with 52 countries in the region, the DPRK only maintains 15 
ambassadors in the region. Wertz, JJ Oh, and Kim Insung,” DPRK Diplomatic Relations.” 
66 Wertz, Oh, and Insung,” DPRK Diplomatic Relations.” 
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Figure 3.  Europe and Central Asia: Countries Maintaining Ambassador Level Relations 
with the DPRK67 
a. Italy and Germany 
Arguably, the two most important countries to the DPRK in this region are Italy 
and Germany. Both countries have ambassadors in residence. Additionally, this 
importance is reflected in the number of times these countries are mentioned in the 
DPRK press. Since DPRK rapprochement and the diplomatic push with Europe, the thin 
bond between North Korea and Europe has been economic with both Italy and Germany 
                                                 
67 These numbers are derived from queries of the Japan-based KCNA server 
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at its fragile core. Companies based in Germany and Italy have held joint ventures in 
North Korea. To facilitate these joint ventures, a Europe specific DPRK based chamber 
of commerce of sort was established in 2005, which is called the European Business 
Association (EBA).68 The EBA’s mission is stated to, “promote and develop business 
and trade relations between Europe and North Korea.”69 This author was unable to 
ascertain the full extent of current joint ventures between European states and the DPRK 
at this time, but it is expected that the fallout from the capricious closing of the Kaesong 
Industrial Complex in early 2013 will have some long-term negative impacts on 
prospects for future joint ventures.70 
In April 2013, North Korea made an unexpected and unilateral decision to close 
the ROK-DPRK Kaesong Industrial Complex only to reopen it later in September 2013. 
Undoubtedly, this move will hamper additional foreign direct investment (FDI) given the 
greater perception of risk now present in the minds of potential foreign investors. China, 
of course, maintains a number of joint ventures with the DPRK, but these are not likely 
subject to the same risks as those held by the ROK or European investors given China 
does maintain more political influence over the DPRK than the ROK or European 
governments.71 It is likely that European investors will focus on joint ROK-DPRK 
ventures to gauge potential risks before entering into new ventures with the DPRK. How 
the DPRK continues to manage Kaesong in this coming year will likely have great 
influence on future investment from European investors. 
Both Germany and Italy fall under the European’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, which has also greatly dampened economic activities between these states due to 
more restrictive measures against the DPRK because of its 2013 nuclear tests. In April 
2013, the European Union strengthened measures against the DPRK in an effort to 
                                                 
68 European Business Association, “About Us: Missions and Values,” accessed July 11, 2013, 
http://www.eba-pyongyang.com/aboutus/index.php. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Bradley Babson, “North Korea’s Push for Special Enterprise Zones: Fantasy or Opportunity?” 
December 12, 2013, 38 North, U.S. Korea Institute at SAIS. http://38north.org/2013/12/bbabson121213/. 
71 Drew Thompson, “Silent Partners: Chinese Joint Ventures in North Korea,” U.S. Korea Institute at 
SAIS, February 2011, http://uskoreainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/USKI_Report_Silent 
Partners_DrewThompson_020311.pdf. 
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implement UN Security Council resolution 2094 fully. EU sanctions specifically restrict 
“trade, transport and financial sectors.”72 Both the uncertainty previously discussed, and 
these restrictions imposed on economic activities, will continue to hamper any future 
efforts in the near term for further economic cooperation. 
3. Africa and Middle East 
DPRK relations in Africa and the Middle East date back to the period 
immediately after the collapse of imperialism and colonialism in the 1960s and 1970s. At 
this time, the DPRK attempted to take full advantage of marketing its juche ideology 
throughout both regions. In the immediate post-colonial period, this DPRK-based 
ideology of independence and self-reliance had real resonance with those states still 
attempting to author a new narrative after being freshly freed from the grip of their 
imperial masters. This freedom served the DPRK in its contest for legitimacy with the 
ROK on the world stage as it facilitated a wave of diplomatic recognition in a fairly short 
period.73 
In the present age, North Korea’s relations with Africa are largely holdovers from 
a previous era. When characterizing DPRK-African relations, Professor Kim Yong-hyun 
at Dongguk University in Seoul said, “Pyongyang cannot provide the kind of economic 
assistance to African countries [it once did] in the post-Cold War era, so its relations can 
only remain perfunctory.”74 Largely “perfunctory” is perhaps the best characterization of 
African-DPRK relations as a whole. The KCNA runs almost daily stories about various 
communications or significant DPRK anniversary celebrations held in African countries, 
but these stories appear to be the same type of story that the DPRK press has run since 
                                                 
72 European Union, The EU and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, April 29, 2013, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/136733.pdf. 
73 Armstrong, “Juche and North Korea’s Global Aspirations,” 5–6; Jae Kyu Park, “North Korea’s 
Foreign Policy Toward Africa,” in The Foreign Relations of North Korea New Perspectives, ed. Jae Kyu 
Park, Byung Chul Koh, and Tae-Hwan Kwak (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 461; Chung-in Moon, 
“Between Ideology and Interest: North Korea in the Middle East,” in The Foreign Relations of North 
Korea: New Perspectives, ed. Jae Kyu Park, Byung Chul Koh, and Tae-Hwan Kwak (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1987), 379. 
74 Kim Yong-hyun as quoted in Yonhap News Agency, “N. Korea Strengthens Diplomatic Ties with 
Africa,” August 13, 2013, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2013/08/13/82/0401000000AEN 
20130813001400315F.html. 
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the apex of its African relations in the 1960s and 1970s. These stories likely remain 
fixtures of the KCNA as part of the DPRK propaganda apparatus to demonstrate how the 
DPRK and its ideals are celebrated and revered abroad. Such stories fit nicely with the 
DPRK narrative as the supporter of the subjugated, but other than flowery words, little 
substance remains. A few notable exceptions are addressed in this section. 
While relations in the Middle East have their roots in the same post-colonial 
period, and are largely perfunctory, significant exchanges have occurred between a few 
key countries in the Middle East. These exchanges have not only had significant 
implications for the region, but also, the international system as a whole. Before 
discussing these specific relationships, this thesis provides an overview of the 
ambassador level relations of the DPRK in the region. 
As in other regions, DPRK ambassadors have responsibility for multiple 
countries. While the DPRK maintains relations with 60 countries throughout Africa and 
the Middle East, it has only 11 ambassadors in the region (for a detailed list of states 
please see footnote75).76 See Figures 4 and 5. 
                                                 
75 In Africa and the Middle East, the DPRK maintains ambassadorial level relations with Algeria, 
Angola, Bahrain, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissua, Iran, Jordon, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, 
Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South 
Africa, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, West Bank, Yemen, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. As in other regions, DPRK ambassadors have responsibility for multiple countries. 
While the DPRK maintains relations with 60 countries throughout Africa and the Middle East, it has only 
11 ambassadors in the region. Wertz, Oh, and Insung, “DPRK Diplomatic Relations.” 
76 Wertz, Oh, and Insung, “DPRK Diplomatic Relations.” 
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Figure 4.  Africa: Countries Maintaining Ambassador Level Relations with the DPRK77 
                                                 
77 These numbers are derived from queries of the Japan-based KCNA server 
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Figure 5.  Middle East: Countries Maintaining Ambassador Level Relations with the 
DPRK78 
a. Democratic Republic of the Congo 
While much of the relationship between the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
and the DPRK is defined by its past, some evidence suggests the two states maintain a 
substantive relationship. As Figure 4 shows, the Democratic Republic of Congo was 
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mentioned approximately some 1,400 times from 1997–2014 in the DPRK press.79 
According to 2012 European Commission Trade Data, the Congo remains the DPRK’s 
fifth top trading partner with a trade volume of approximately $213m annually.80 Reports 
are also available of DPRK weapons transfers to the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC)—specifically, the transfer of sensitive dual use missile technology, but little 
evidence of further military ties or technology exchanges exists.81 
b. Iran 
While North Korea maintains relations with multiple countries in the Middle East, 
Iran received considerable play in the DPRK press, which is not likely a surprise to those 
familiar with Iran’s position in the world and its ongoing confrontation with the West. 
Iran, like North Korea, has declared its right as a sovereign nation to pursue nuclear 
energy production, but also, like North Korea, evidence exists to suggest Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions go beyond energy production. While the countries of Iran and North Korea 
have dissimilar geo-political situations, from the DPRK press, some belief that their fates 
are intertwined can be discerned. That is to say, how the West and the United Nations 
decide to deal with the nuclear question with one state is likely to impact how it deals 
with the other state. Any new actions in the United Nations or from the international 
community towards Iran afford the DPRK an opportunity to express to the world 
indirectly how it wishes to be treated. The DRPK view espoused in the press has likely 
less to do with Iran, and everything to do with how it feels about its own precarious 
position. This feeling reflected in a KCNA press statement regarding new proposed UN 
sanctions against Iran, “[a]ll forms of sanctions and pressure on Iran including military 
                                                 
79 As the Figure 4 indicates, Guinea had the most mentions in the DPRK press from 1997 to 2014; 
however, this author chose not to provide any additional details regarding the DRPK’s relationship with 
Guinea, largely due to a lack of available materials in the open source realm that provided any details 
regarding the nature of relations between the two states in the present. Additionally, its high return is likely 
based on the fact that it includes hits for Guinea-Bissau and Equatorial Guinea, and thus, is not a valid 
return. 
80 European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, European Union, Trade in Goods with North 
Korea (July 2013), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113428.pdf. 
81 Mark Bromley and Paul Holtom, “Arms Transfers to the Democratic Republic of the Congo: 
Assessing the System of Arms Transfer Notifications, 2008–2010,” Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, October 2010, http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRIBP1010a.pdf, 1. 
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option should be renounced with immediate effect. Iran’s nuclear issue should be settled 
through dialogue and negotiations. The DPRK opposes and rejects the U.S. and West 
attempt to abuse peaceful nuclear issue as a means for overthrowing the system of a 
sovereign state.”82 The not so subtle message to the international community in this 
statement from the DPRK is “we will continue to reject any efforts to hinder our 
pursuit/refinement of nuclear technologies.” 
While much of the nature of relations between the DPRK and Iran is unclear 
given the opacity of both states, at least hints of a substantive relationship in the open 
source realm do emerge. On September 2, 2012, the KCNA reported an “MOU on 
cooperation in science, technology and education between the governments of the DPRK 
and Iran was signed in Tehran on Saturday.”83 The fact that two countries, sharing 
similar nuclear pariah status in the international community, signed an agreement of 
cooperation is interesting. Perhaps more interesting, however, is those attending the 
signing. According to the KCNA’s account of those present, “DPRK side were Kim 
Yong Nam, president of the Presidium of the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly, 
Foreign Minister Pak Ui Chun, DPRK Ambassador to Iran Jo In Chol and other suite 
members and from the Iranian side President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Fereydoon 
Abbasi-Davani, vice-president and concurrently head of Atomic Energy Organization, 
Ahmad Vahidi, minister of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics, Mehdi Ghazanfari, 
minister of Industrial, Mining and Trade, Kamran Daneshjoo, minister of Science, 
Research and Technology, the minister of Agriculture and the governor of the Central 
Bank and officials concerned.”84 Most striking is the attendance of “Abbasi-Davani, vice-
president and concurrently head of Atomic Energy Organization”85 and “Ahmad Vahidi, 
minister of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics.”86 At least in some manner, the 
                                                 
82 Korean Central News Agency of DPRK, “DPRK Opposes All Forms of Sanctions and Pressure,” 
December 12, 2011, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2011/201112/news12/20111212-08ee.html. 
83 Korean Central News Agency of DPRK, “MOU Signed Between DPRK and Iran,” September 2, 
2012, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2012/201209/news02/20120902-09ee.html. 




presence of the head of the Atomic Energy Organization and the Minister of Defense at 
the signing may portend a relationship not confined to civil science and technology, but 
also implies cooperation in military technology as well. Well-documented missile 
cooperation exists between the two countries to include Iran’s purchasing of Nodong 
MRBMs in the 1990s. Also, numerous reports states that the DPRK is assisting Iran with 
the production of longer-range ballistic missiles. These activities are no doubt an 
important revenue source for Kim Jong Un and DPRK elites.87 While undoubtedly the 
transfer of funds for services rendered has proved harder after the more universal 
application of tougher sanctions in 2013, this important bilateral relationship must be 
watched for further signs of cooperation. 
c. Syria 
Syria, second only to Iran in the region for the number of mentions in the KCNA, 
remains an important bilateral relationship to the DPRK. Syria and North Korea maintain 
embassies in the other’s capital. For further evidence of the importance of this bilateral 
relation, look at the KCNA reporting from the July 2013 “60th Anniversary of Victory in 
Fatherland Liberation War”88 celebration. In the brief description offered of foreign 
delegations in attendance, Syrian officials are one of only a few mentioned, listed only 
after China. Additionally, during this visit, Kim Jong Un took time to meet personally 
with the delegation.89 Meeting personally is not a privilege afforded to every visiting 
foreign delegation. These two countries have numerous formal agreements expressed 
through MOUs. The MOUs formalize cooperation in areas ranging from tourism to 
science and technology.90 While the memorandum of understandings (MOUs) make no 
                                                 
87 Mark Manyin, North Korea: Back on the Terrorism List?, CRS Report RL30613 (Washington, DC: 
Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, June 29, 2010). 
88 Korean Central News Agency of DPRK, “National Meeting Marks 60th Anniversary of Victory in 
Fatherland Liberation War,” July 26, 2013, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201307/news26/20130726-
53ee.html. 
89 North Korea Leadership Watch, “Kim Jong Un Meets with Syrian Delegation,” July 25, 2013, 
http://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/category/dprk-syria-relations/. 
90 Korean Central News Agency of DPRK, “Agreements and MOU Signed between DPRK and 
Syria,” October 28, 2009, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200910/news28/20091028-15ee.html; Korean 
Central News Agency of DPRK, “DPRK, Syria Sign MOUs and Agreements,” November 5, 2012, 
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2012/201211/news05/20121105-22ee.html. 
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direct mention of military ties, and no formal security alliance exists, they do share a 
mature military relationship as well, which is outlined in a recent CRS report.91 Included 
in this reporting are claims that the DPRK has exported nuclear technology for energy 
production and possible weapons production to Syria in recent years.92 Some reporting 
has gone as far as claiming a possible DPRK-Syria chemical weapons link.93 Such 
reports led the DPRK through its official press—as it has with past allegations—to refute 
these charges saying, “some foreign media are floating misinformation that the DPRK 
supplied war equipment to Syria, its airmen are directly involved in air-raids on insurgent 
troops in Syria, etc. This is nothing but part of the foolish plots of the hostile forces to 
tarnish the image of the peace-loving DPRK and cover up their criminal acts of blocking 
the peaceful settlement of the Syrian situation.”94 
Much like the way the DPRK views its fate as in some way tied to that of Iran, so 
also does the DPRK likely hold similar views concerning Syria. Some evidence also 
exists to suggest this perception is a reciprocal view. When the DPRK declared its 
intentions to pull out of the NPT95 in 2003, Wolid Hamdoun, a leader in the Syrian Arab 
Socialist Baath Party said, “Syria and the DPRK are standing in the same trench of the 
struggle against the U.S. vicious and aggressive offensives and expressed full support to 
the principled stand and decision of People’s Korea.”96 If Syria stood with the DPRK, 
then it is likely that this solidarity has been further bolstered by recent events. The regime 
of President Bashar al-Assad enjoys questionable domestic support and has increasingly 
become viewed unfavorably in the international community. Yet, he still clings to power 
                                                 
91 Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and 
Internal Situation, CRS Report RL41259 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research 
Service, January 15, 2014). 
92 Gregory L. Schulte, “Uncovering Syria’s Covert Reactor,” Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, January 2010, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/schulte_syria.pdf, 4–5. 
93 Alexandre Mansourov, “North Korea: Entering Syria’s Civil War,” 38 North, U.S. Korea Institute at 
SAIS, November 25, 2013, http://38north.org/2013/11/amansourov112513/. 
94 Korean Central News Agency of DPRK, “DPRK Refutes False Rumor About Its Involvement in 
Military Operations in Syria,” November 14, 2013, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201311/news14/ 
20131114-27ee.html. 
95 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 
96 As quoted in Mansourov, “North Korea: Entering Syria’s Civil War.” 
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and has thus far evaded foreign military intervention into Syrian affairs. Given this 
possible perception in the DPRK, and to some degree Syria, that their fates are tied, 
further cooperation and the strengthening of ties between these two countries in the near 
term is likely to occur. 
4. South, Southeast, and East Asia 
DPRK relations vary greatly depending on which part of Asia being examined. In 
East Asia, DPRK relations are dominated by security. To the south and east, security 
concerns are rooted in the constant threat of possible military confrontation with the 
ROK, Japan, and their mutual ally, the United States. To the north, security concerns are 
different, but nonetheless, still very real. Friendly relations with the PRC remain critical 
to DPRK survival, as without its trade and backing in the international system, its 
security situation would become even more tenuous. Turning to Southeast Asia, the 
former glory of DRPK relations are largely seen in its Third World outreach of the 1960s 
and 1970s, fraternal bonds, and non-aligned states membership still at play.97 In South 
Asia, the two most important relations remains Pakistan and India. Pakistan and North 
Korea have had a bidirectional relationship in missile and nuclear weapon 
development.98 See Figure 6.  
India remains a powerful trading partner and stands as the DPRK’s second top 
trading partner with total trade standing at approximately $300 million to China’s 
approximately $4 billion in total trade.99 While China’s trade volume with the DPRK 
decidedly dwarfs that of India, the contribution that Indian goods make and the 
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importance of trade in the DPRK economy cannot be discounted given its paltry state. 
Overall, relations in this region remain the most important relations to the DPRK state.100 
 
Figure 6.  South, Southeast, East Asia: Countries Maintaining Ambassador Level 
Relations with the DPRK101 
                                                 
100 Throughout Asia, the DPRK has ambassadorial level representation in Bangladesh, India, 
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Throughout Southeast and East Asia it maintain relations with 
Brunei, Cambodia, China, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Papua New 
Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vanuatu, and Vietnam. Wertz, Oh, and Insung, “DPRK 
Diplomatic Relations.” 
101 These numbers are derived from queries of the Japan-based KCNA server 
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a. India 
India and the DPRK first established diplomatic ties December 12, 1973.102 The 
DPRK press is filled with frequent accounts of various exchanges of correspondence 
between the two states and seminars held in India to explore the “Juche Idea.”103 India’s 
Ministry of External Affairs characterizes the relationship between India and DPRK in 
the following way. 
Relations between India and DPR Korea have been generally 
characterised [sic] by friendship, cooperation and understanding. As 
members of the Non-Aligned Movement, there is a commonality of views 
between the two on many international issues, e.g. Disarmament, South-
South Cooperation, etc. Both sides continue to work closely in 
international fora and support each other on various issues of bilateral and 
international interests.104 
While it is true that both states are members of the Non-Aligned Movement and may 
share some bond because of their mutual membership, it is surprising that the two 
countries have relations at all. Pakistan—which whom India has a very active territorial 
dispute over Kashmir—and the DPRK are assessed to have shared military technology 
and information in both directions over the years. North Korea is reported to have sold 
Nodong MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) to Pakistan in the 1980s.105 
Surprisingly, these instances of cooperation and weapons transfers have not seemingly 
placed a significant damper on India-DPRK relations in the present. 
Numerous bilateral agreements exist between the DPRK and India that range 
from “cooperation in science and technology” to “cooperation in the field of 
information.”106  
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In recent years, India has remained one of the DPRK’s premier trading partners, 
but according to a January 2014 Indian Ministry of Commerce (MOC) report, trade 
declined drastically in 2013 “due to [a DPRK] financial crunch.”107 The same report also 
claims that the DPRK seeks to increase the volume of trade on a “deferred payment 
basis”108 and “barter trade.”109 While it appears the DPRK is keen to increase trade, 
Indian firms only appear to have tepid interest, given “limited foreign exchange with 
DPRK, non-availability of direct shipping and non-guarantee of payments through an 
established banking and insurance system.”110 The same MOC report also states that the 
DPRK would “welcome participation of Indian companies in joint ventures and FDI.”111 
This desire for participation is no doubt true as Kim Jong Un and the ruling elite’s further 
attempt to secure additional revenue streams, but as discussed earlier in this thesis, 
foreign firms will watch Kaesong in the near term to determine the current level of risk 
for entering into these types of ventures in the DPRK. Any significant FDI or joint 
venture announcements in the near term should not be expected, and thus, relations 
between the two states will likely persist at status quo. 
b. Mongolia 
Mongolia has ties with North Korea that date back to the DPRK’s emergence as a 
state in 1948. On October 15, 1948, only three days after the USSR, Mongolia recognized 
the DPRK as a state.112 This recognition is not surprising given that among the 12 states 
to recognize the DPRK in the period 1948–1950, all were closely tied to the USSR. What 
is interesting is that some semblance of a strong bond between the two states has endured 
into the present age. In October 2013, some 63 years after recognizing the DPRK, and 
nearly 19 years after Mongolia adopted a new constitution and transitioned to a market 
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economy and democratic society,113 evidence of this strong bond is seen in Mongolian 
President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj’s visit to the DPRK as the first head of state to visit the 
country after Kim Jong Un’s succession. While Elbegdorj did not meet with Kim Jong 
Un, not meeting was likely less to do with Mongolia-DPRK relations and more to do with 
a desire to withhold the first summit privilege for China or Russia.114 On this visit, the 
two countries entered into “an agreement on cooperation in the fields of industry and 
agriculture and an agreement on cooperation in the fields of culture, sports and 
tourism.”115 This agreement was signed after a number of other agreements were signed 
between the two states earlier in the year.116 
Economic cooperation between the two states appears to be increasing. Of 
particular note is the June 2013 acquisition of a 20 percent stake in a DPRK state-run oil 
refinery by a Mongolian company, which as the ROK-based Institute for Far Eastern 
Studies think tank points out is, “the first purchase by a Mongolian-listed company of a 
foreign asset.”117 These steps are significant as it could lead to further economic 
activities between the two countries. It also could lead to fulfilling a long held ambition 
of Mongolia of gaining port access in North Korea.118 While on his October 2013 visit to 
Pyongyang the Mongolian President said: 
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Our two countries do indeed have opportunities for mutually 
complimentary economic cooperation. Mongolia is a land-locked country. 
Mongolia is interested to boost our economic cooperation with other 
countries by using the DPRK’s infrastructure and sea ports. We do see 
ample opportunities of cooperation in railways, air and auto-transport and 
sea-ports. Also, the Korean side proposed establishing a live-stock 
husbandry complex. This is another area of productive cooperation. 
Mongolia is a country of rich experience in animal husbandry. Mongolia 
can train DPRK’s livestock husbandry students and specialists in 
Mongolia, and our veterinarians and specialists can come to DPRK to 
work on various projects. I understand that the people who will realize 
these cooperation opportunities into concrete businesses have gathered 
here today for this meeting. The people of Mongolia, our businessmen, our 
companies and firms do realize and see these opportunities of cooperation, 
and therefore, so many of them have arrived to DPRK to engage in, 
discuss and materialize joint businesses. I call you for active undertakings 
and cooperation.119 
While no such agreement exists yet, it can be seen how an agreement of this nature would 
benefit both countries. In the near term, additional economic engagement between the 
countries of Mongolia and the DRPK should be expected, and thus, a strengthening of 
ties. 
                                                 
119 Office of the President of Mongolia, “President Elbegdorj.” 
 49 
IV. DPRK INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL 
PARTICIPATION  
A. DPRK INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION 1991–2011 
This thesis now turns to a discussion on the DPRK’s participation in international 
institutions. Much like the treatment of the DPRK’s minor foreign relations, it receives 
little attention. DPRK participation in international institutions is important to understand 
given that participation is one of the few formal venues the DPRK has to communicate 
with the outside world and states outside of the Big Four. 
In this age of unprecedented global connectedness when examining a state’s 
memberships in international institutions, it is often easier to discuss in which institutions 
a country does not participate. The DPRK is not one of these states. According to the 
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s “The World Fact Book,” the DPRK currently 
maintains membership in 26 international institutions (see Figure 7).120
 
The Correlates of 
War (COW) database holds that the DPRK maintains membership in 28 organizations.121
 
Both databases accept slightly different definitions of international organizations, but 
regardless of which definition found more accurate, DPRK participation is low when 
compared to its neighbor to the south and other states in the region. The ROK maintains 
membership in 73 international institutions.122 The fact that ROK institutional 
membership is greater than DPRK should be of no surprise given its impressive 
economic rise and relative good standing in the international community in recent years. 
While North Korean membership numbers are low compared to South Korea, it does 
maintain membership levels higher than other states in the region. Taiwan, the other 
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pariah state of East Asia,123
 
only maintains membership with seven international 
organizations.124 Perhaps a more fitting comparison may be Burma, which until recently 
was often classified in a similar category as North Korea; it maintains membership in 41 
international institutions.125 This author does not mean to imply that sheer numbers 
indicate the quality of a given country’s membership in an international institution, but 
they do provide at least a superficial understanding of its opportunities for participation in 
the international system and how a country may perceive them. 
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states to interact with Taiwan as a state entity for fear of some measure of reprisal from the PRC. 





Figure 7.  DPRK Membership in International Institutions 1985–2011126 
To gain a more substantive understanding of DPRK institutional participation, it 
is necessary to look at a few key international organizations and DPRK participation in 
those organizations. The two most important institutions that the DPRK maintains 
membership in are the United Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This 
paper now turns to an examination of DPRK participation in the United Nations followed 
by a discussion on its participation in the ARF. 
B. NORTH KOREA IN THE UNITED NATIONS 
While North Korea maintained observer status and participated in the United 
Nations from its mission in New York beginning in 1973, full membership was not 
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gained until 1991. This membership was achieved concurrently with the other half of the 
Korean Peninsula, the ROK. While a significant step, met with much optimism, it proved 
substantively to change little in North Korea or its position in the international system. 
With the abrupt end of the Cold War, Russia quickly established relations with 
South Korea, which came as a big jolt to the DPRK. Certainly, the fact that Russia was 
engaging the archenemy of its previous client state was significant, but perhaps most 
significant was the promise from Russia that came as a result of the engagement. Russia, 
maintaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, assured South Korea that it 
would not block its petition for full UN membership. With one word of Russia’s 
intentions, the DPRK quickly had to reverse its enduring objections to South Korea and 
North Korea gaining UN membership as separate entities. North Korea was essentially 
forced to reverse its stance for fear that South Korea would enjoy a greater measure of 
international legitimacy in the contest to be viewed as the sole rightful government of the 
Korean peninsula. In a telling statement released from the DPRK foreign ministry, some 
three months before North Korea would gain its full membership, and containing much of 
the rhetoric seen to this day, it would articulate its reluctance to joining the United 
Nations.127 
Taking advantage of the rapid changes in the international situation, the 
south Korean authorities are committing the never-to-be condoned treason 
to divide Korea into two parts ... by trying to force their way into the 
United Nations .... As the south Korean authorities insist on their unilateral 
United Nations membership, if we leave this alone, important issues 
related to the interests of the entire Korean nation would be dealt with in a 
biased manner on the United Nations rostrum and this would entail grave 
consequences. We can never let it go that way. The Government of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has no alternative but to enter the 
United Nations at the present stage as a step to tide over such temporary 
difficulties created by the south Korean authorities.128 
While countries do not need to join international institutions out of pure intentions, an 
implied spirit of pragmatism helps states reach common goals. The aforementioned 
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statement serves as powerful foreshadowing demonstrating that the pragmatism that led 
North Korea into the international body would not endure and continue to define its 
behavior both in the UN system and the world stage.129 
Samuel S. Kim, the Korean foreign relations scholar, only six years after North 
Korea had achieved full UN membership, wrote the following: “[d]espite all the 
sweeping changes that have occurred in the domestic, regional, and global situations over 
the last seven years, continuity, not change, has remained the dominant element of North 
Korean foreign policy.”130 He continues to say, “Pyongyang is still fighting the cold war 
North Korean style in the post-cold war world organization, putatively in order to 
eliminate the remnants of the cold war.”131 While the enduring validity of Kim’s analysis 
in the present may be questioned, this author and others agree it remains an unfortunately 
accurate characterization of DPRK UN membership. Writing for the International Peace 
Institute in March 2013, Eduardo Albrecht penned something very similar to the 
characterization offered by Dr. Kim some 16 years earlier. 
[I]t is not uncommon for Security Council resolutions to be utilized by the 
DPRK to reach some kind of strategic objective of its own. In particular, 
the DPRK has been successfully provoking the Security Council with 
weapons proliferation in order to (a) play the great powers against each 
other, (b) gain the upper hand in negotiating with the US and Japan, (c) 
portray itself as the legitimate defender of the Korean people, North and 
South, and (d) test the attitude of the international community, particularly 
the US, toward itself. 132 
Playing “great powers against each other,”133 and “portray[ing] itself as the legitimate 
defender of the Korean people, North and South”134—these themes seem all too familiar 
and point to a state that has not found agreement with the international community 
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regarding common goals and collective goods, which speaks to a state actor that has been 
touched by international institutions, but remains immune to their potential behavior 
moderating forces. This immunity in the North Korean case leaves a state that clings to 
its Juche ideology no matter how contradictory to its standing in the world today. 
C. NORTH KOREA AND ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM 
After North Korea gained membership in the United Nations and a number of its 
sub-organizations throughout the 1990s, its institutional participation did not change 
significantly until the year 2000, when it participated for the first time in the ARF. It is 
worth nothing that North Korea sought participation in the regional forum, perhaps 
demonstrating a will to be further connected with the regional and international 
community.135 While North Korea would not officially participate in ARF until 2000, the 
situation on the Peninsula had been discussed since ARF’s establishment. Readers of this 
paper no doubt understand the broad objectives of the United Nations; perhaps less clear 
are those of the ARF. The ARF came into existence after the 26th ASEAN ministerial 
meeting in 1993. The objectives of ARF, as advertised, are “1. to foster constructive 
dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and 
concern; and 2. to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building 
and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.”136 In line with this mission, the 
ARF has continued to voice support for negations aimed at the denuclearization of North 
Korea and full implementation of the Agreed Framework.137  
North Korea’s entry and participation into the ARF was viewed with promise as 
reflected in the ARF chairman’s statement.  
The Ministers noted with satisfaction the positive developments on the 
Korean Peninsula, including the increased dialogue and exchanges 
between the DPRK and several ARF countries. They welcomed in 
particular the historic Summit between the leaders of the DPRK and the 
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ROK and expressed their support for the ‘June 15 North - South Joint 
Declaration.’ The Ministers also expressed the hope for further efforts by 
all parties concerned within the frameworks of inter-Korean dialogue, the 
US-DPRK and Japan-DPRK talks, the Four-Party Talks, and broader 
international efforts, as well as for further positive developments regarding 
the temporary moratorium by the DPRK on missile test launches and for 
the full implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework, including the 
work of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization 
(KEDO).138 
This optimism was not wholly unfounded. After all, ARF is the only other body aside 
from the United Nations that addresses security issues in which the DPRK sits alongside 
the United States, Japan, and other regional powers. The DPRK has also been active 
within ARF. As Rodolfo Severino points out in his book, The ASEAN Regional Forum, 
“[f]rom 2001 to 2007, North Korea contributed to no less than five issues of the ARF’s 
Annual Security Outlook. Since its admission into the ARF, the DPRK has taken part in 
certain ‘inter-sessional’ activities, that is, ARF events between ministerial meetings, but 
not in others.”139 Of distinct significance is their participation in the March 2006 seminar 
on “non-proliferation and weapons of mass destruction [WMD].”140 DPRK attendance in 
this seminar has a unique irony given 2006 was a banner year for North Korean WMD 
delivery and development. In this year, it test-fired a long-range Taepodong-2 missile in 
July, and tested its first nuclear weapon in October.141 While no one would make the 
assertion that mere attendance and membership is enough to restrain certain behaviors of 
a state, it is worth remembering that talk and attendance mean little; it is in deeds a state 
must accessed. 
North Korea’s participation in international institutions can only be characterized 
as minimal. For North Korea to gain entry into additional international institutions, it 
would have to greatly modify current behaviors and adopt a level of transparency that it 
is unlikely to agree to in the near term. 
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In the post-Cold War period, North Korea diplomatically became lost for a time. 
No longer having benefactors whose rivalry could be manipulated, the DPRK largely had 
to find its own way diplomatically. As Charles Armstrong puts it, “[a]fter the collapse of 
North Korea’s communist allies at the end of the Cold War, ‘self-reliance’ had to face the 
bitter test of reality, and hundreds of thousands of North Koreans died in the process. The 
world had changed radically, but North Korea refused to change with it, and insisted on 
following its own path: fiercely nationalist, militant, self-enclosed.”142 This idea is 
reflected throughout DPRK relations. While the rest of the world sought to take 
advantage of many of the opportunities that became only available in the post-Cold War 
period, the DPRK seemed to maintain its Cold War diplomatic tack. 
B. TRENDS 
1. Continuity 
A trend immediately evident throughout DPRK relations is a recent reaffirmation 
of some of its most troubling minor relations. The continuity of DPRK relations and not 
change is most remarkable. Many foreign observers predicted that Kim Jong Un would 
distance the DPRK from regimes like that of Assad’s Syria in wake of the Arab Spring, 
but this prediction proved incorrect.143 Much the opposite has seemed to play out as 
evidenced by continued DPRK support for Assad in Syria. Alexandre Mansourov 
characterizes Pyongyang’s efforts as follows. 
Pyongyang’s involvement in Syria characterizes Kim Jong Un more as a 
steady hand and traditional alliance manager than an erratic wanderer and 
opportunistic risk-taker. Although he is playing with fire in the shifting 
sands of far-flung lands like Syria, but he is simply staying the course set 
forth by his grandfather and upheld by his father, demonstrating continuity 
in North Korea’s foreign policy. Moreover, potential material and 
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reputational rewards far outweigh possible security or diplomatic risks, 
especially if Kim’s bet on Assad’s eventual victory proves to be 
correct.144 
This same type of continuity can be seen in DPRK relations with Iran and Cuba as well. 
Aside from the material support and technical support that the DPRK may provide to 
other nations, perhaps its greatest export is something less tangible. 
Traditionally, goods and services on the ledger of a nation’s exports are examined 
to determine its primary export. North Korea’s chief export will not be found on any 
ledger or buried in an economic table because of its intangible nature. This author 
contends that the DPRK’s chief export—either intentionally exported with political 
advisors or merely standing as a model—is how to stay in power despite overwhelming 
odds. Exporting this model is a partial fulfillment of Kim Il Sung’s desire to stand as a 
leader of the globe’s subjugated states, and thus further, contributes to the legitimacy of 
Kim Jong Un and serves as a point of pride for the DPRK.145 The DPRK stands as 
enduring inspiration to those on the fringe of the international system on how best to flout 
even the most effective levers of the globe’s most powerful states and institutions 
directly. Syria, with which this thesis has demonstrated the DPRK has a special 
relationship, offers the perfect example. 
In August 2013, tensions between factions in Syria and President Bashar al-Assad 
were at a decisive point. During this period, calls for Assad to step down were common 
and growing throughout the international community. Possible military intervention to 
force Assad out of power was discussed. During this time, Assad chose to employ a very 
North Korea-like tactic. Assad’s regime, containing no mature nuclear weapon program, 
chose to use chemical weapons on its own population. Why would Assad and his regime 
do such a thing? The short answer is to make intervention so costly or undesirable that 
those suggesting military intervention may rethink their previous calls. The DPRK makes 
a similar move when it decides to detonate a nuclear weapon. By not only demonstrating 
that a state has a nuclear weapon, but also that it is capable and not afraid to detonate a 
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device despite pressure from the international community, is one way the DPRK 
broadcasts to outsiders that intervention will be costly. 
It is important to note that this author has no direct evidence that Assad was 
inspired by the DPRK; however, as this thesis has argued, significant links are apparent 
between the two states. As Alexandre Mansourov recently outlined in his article “North 
Korea: Entering Syria’s Civil War” that “[s]ince the beginning of this year [2013] alone, 
Kim Jong Un has exchanged personal letters with Bashar Al-Assad on ten different 
occasions—more than with any other foreign leader, including Chinese. Many senior 
DPRK leaders have either visited Syria over the past two decades or worked closely with 
its government.”146 As mentioned, this author was unable to find direct evidence of 
inspiration, but extensive ties are present at multiple levels of both governments. It is 
possible, and perhaps even likely, that Assad’s actions are both inspired and informed by 
DPRK’s experience. 
Certainly, chemical weapons are not nuclear weapons, and in no way, match the 
magnitude of potential destruction if employed, but they do grab the attention of the 
international community. Nuclear weapons are an easy deterrent in that once outsiders 
understand that a country possesses these weapons, and may even have a potential means 
of delivery deterrence, in some measure, goes on auto pilot. Perhaps, a state like the 
DPRK occasionally must detonate a device, in defiance of the international community, 
just to prove that it will not be constrained. Syria was forced in August 2013 to 
demonstrate to the outside world that intervention would be costly. Unlike nuclear 
weapons, the mere testing of chemical weapons is not an effective deterrent. Chemical 
weapons do not act as a deterrent just by merely being present in a given state’s arsenal. 
To serve as an effective deterrent, chemical weapons must be used. Then and only then, 
will the message be broadcast to the international community calling for infringement of 
the state’s sovereignty—intervention will be costly. While this author has only indirect 
evidence that the DPRK may be advising the Assad regime on how to stay in power, it 
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cannot be denied that at the very least the DPRK stands as the shining example of what a 
state and its ruling elite must do to stay in power despite overwhelming odds. 
2. Possible Hedging 
Since mid-2013, with the more universal application of sanctions against North 
Korea, its minor relations have become even more important, especially with those states 
in which it shares similar standing on the fringe of the international system. As the DPRK 
has been further isolated, it will likely become more desperate in its attempts to guarantee 
revenue for Kim Jong Un and the DPRK ruling elites. This network of minor relations, 
and in particular fringe states, will become more important in a number of areas, 
especially trade. Having warm relations with a number of minor powers could assist the 
DPRK in weathering a sharp cooling in PRC relations. As the DPRK intimated to India, 
it desires to increase its barter relations.147 Given this stated goal, it can be expected that 
DPRK barter trade will increase, particularly with those countries willing to flout the new 
more restrictive UN sanctions as evidenced by the attempted transfer of military 
hardware between Cuba and the DPRK in 2013. Given the further isolation of the DPRK, 
and a growing desperation as a result, those relations that appeared to be relics of a 
previous era will need to be watched for new signs of life in the near term.148 
As relations cool with its primary benefactor, the DPRK may engage in a new 
more energetic diplomatic campaign. While the foundation of many of the DPRK’s 
bilateral relations may be the DRPK’s contest with the ROK for international legitimacy, 
its possible need to hedge in the event relations with Beijing further cool defines them 
today. Now that Kim Jong Un has consolidated power and appears to have a firm grip on 
the DPRK state, the time may be right for a new wave of diplomatic activity. New 
diplomatic activity could greatly benefit the DPRK as the international community 
continues to search desperately for evidence that Kim Jong Un wants to responsibly 
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engage the outside world. By even feigning a desire to become a responsible member of 
the international community, the DPRK would afford advocates of more Sunshine-like 
policies the evidence they need to advocate for a return to softer policy approaches to the 
DPRK. Projections of new diplomatic activity are supported by a few key pieces of 
evidence. First, some assert that relations between China and the DPRK continue on a 
downward trajectory.149 This assessment is evidenced by PRC support towards efforts to 
curtail activities of North Korean financial institutions in 2013,150 and most recently, by 
the public execution of Jang Song Thaek, who was widely regarded as “Beijing’s 
man.”151 Traditionally, as Pyongyang’s relations with its benefactors (particularly 
Beijing) have waned, its relations with other states have increased. This type of change 
can be seen as a partial explanation of the aggressive outreach from the DPRK that 
occurred in the later part of the 1960s and early part of the 1970s. This period coincides 
with China’s Cultural Revolution, which was a time of great upheaval in China when 
much of its leaders’ focus was on internal affairs. During this time, the DPRK secured 
more bilateral relations than in any other period. This period of new bilateral ties is 
second only to DPRK outreach efforts in 1990s, which further supports this idea given its 
struggle to find its place in the post-Cold War era. This assessed coming surge of 
diplomatic activity will not manifest in the number of new relations established, but 
rather will be seen in the level of engagement.  
Preliminary indications of this engagement are arguably seen in the January 25, 
2014 DPRK UN ambassador’s press conference. While it is a rarity for a DPRK official 
to host a news conference, it is an even greater rarity for the hosting official to take 
questions from Western press. It must be noted that Ambassador Sin Son-Ho did not 
answer Western press corps questions; but merely permitting questions may be initial 
evidence of a new diplomatic push. Further evidence of this push may also be seen in 
Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s speech, whose foreign policy section largely focused on 
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improving ROK-DPRK relations, and which North Korea watchers have called “mildly 
hopeful.”152 Furthermore, the DPRK National Defense Commission’s proposal to ROK 
authorities to resume among other things family reunions is additional possible evidence. 
153 This NDC proposal appears to be bearing initial fruit; last month, family reunions 
occurred for the first time since 2010.154 While reunions have since been paused, likely 
due to the recent ROK-US military exercise, if they were to continue in the near term, it 
would likely portend more extensive diplomatic engagement. While undeniably not 
concrete evidence of a new diplomatic wave, these pieces of evidence, when viewed 
together, could point to new efforts from the DRPK. 
C. OPPORTUNITIES 
Perhaps, the greatest revelation when viewing the minor diplomatic relations of 
North Korea separate from its major relations, are the opportunities for engagement that 
become evident. Given the unique relationship that states like India and Mongolia enjoy 
with the DPRK, the United States should make every opportunity to engage the DPRK 
through these states. As Mongolia enters into deeper economic ties with the DPRK, more 
insight should be sought from the Mongolian government regarding North Korean and 
the true goals and aims of its foreign policy. India should be leveraged in any capacity 
possible, which potentially serves a dual purpose. Not only could India’s relationship 
with the DPRK offer insight into the opaque state, but by having India take a greater role 
in security affairs in the region, sets up India potentially to emerge as an influential 
broker and possible balancer in further shaping of power dynamics in Asia. 
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It also reveals that effective engagement with the DPRK may be more successful 
if taken along its periphery. If anything, the interdicted shipment of weapons from Cuba 
to the DPRK hastens the case for U.S.-Cuban rapprochement. While the United States 
appears to be headed in this direction, it should view acts like the attempted Cuban-
DPRK weapons transfers as a case for hastening such steps rather than justification for 
delay. If the United States is able to exercise influence over Havana, it may facilitate 
indirect influence of Pyongyang. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The minor relations of the DPRK largely remain unexplored. While North Korea 
is undoubtedly an opaque state, many of the countries that it has relations with are not. A 
deeper inquiry of records from the states that the DPRK has diplomatic ties with may 
help shed further light on previously unrecognized trends or intentions of the DPRK state.  
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